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Reporting of confirmed pandemic influenza A virus (pH1N1)
2009 infection was mandatory among health care workers in
Hong Kong. Among 1158 confirmed infections, there was no
significant difference in incidence among clinical versus
nonclinical staff (relative risk, 0.98; 95% confidence interval,
0.78–1.20). Reported community exposure to pH1N1 was
common and was similar in both groups.
Since the emergence of the 2009 pandemic influenza A virus
(pH1N1), its epidemiology and transmission characteristics
have been studied in detail [1–3]. However, relatively limited
data are available on the epidemiology of pH1N1 in health care
settings, particularly regarding the risk of nosocomial acquisi-
tion among health care workers (HCWs). In an early report of
48 HCWs with confirmed pH1N1 infection, information on
health care exposure was available for only 26 individuals [4].
In Hong Kong, the government-funded Hospital Authority
(HA) manages 38 hospitals, representing over 90% of hospital
beds in the territory, and oversees 74 outpatient departments,
including 18 clinics designated for pH1N1 cases and established
especially for the pandemic. The HA implemented mandatory
reporting for HCWs with confirmed pH1N1 infection after the
first case of local transmission was identified, making it possible
to collect detailed information on incidence and risk factors for
confirmed pH1N1 among HCWs.
METHODS
Under the mandatory reporting conditions, all HCWs with
influenza-like illness had to present themselves to staff clinics.
Laboratory testing was free of charge, and specimens were tested
for pH1N1 by reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction
and viral culture [5]. A confirmed case of pH1N1 was defined as
present in a patient with a positive result on either test.
HCWs with confirmed pH1N1 infection were required to
report through their working unit to the HA Major Incident
Control Centre, which was responsible for providing daily
reports of all confirmed cases to the chief infection control
officer (CICO). The CICO office then contacted the infection
control nurse (ICN) responsible for the hospital or clinic for
follow-up and further investigation of any infected HCW.
A standard questionnaire administered through personal in-
terview by an ICN was used to obtain information on each
confirmed case and to assess clinical presentation and the nature
of exposure. Clinical staff were defined as HCWs involved in
direct patient care as part of their regular routine, and nonclinical
staff were defined as those not involved in patient care and with
no opportunity for patient contact during their regular work
routine. The CICO office tracked all cases until the question-
naire was returned, ensuring a 100% response rate.
Mandatory reporting of both clinical and nonclinical staff
began on 17 June 2009 and continued until 31 August 2009.
From 1 September 2009, reporting and investigation was only
mandatory for clinical staff. Reporting of confirmed cases
among clinical staff continued until 31 May 2010, when the
pandemic alert level was downgraded by the Hong Kong gov-
ernment. Compliance with mandatory reporting was likely to be
close to 100%, because all staff with influenza-like illness could
easily be identified by their supervisors, and the 7 days leave for
confirmed cases could only be obtained through this procedure.
RESULTS
A total of 1158 confirmed pH1N1 infections were reported among
HA staff. Most cases were mild, and only 30 (2.6%) required
hospital admission, with nomortality reported. During the period
Received 17 December 2010; accepted 29 March 2011.
Correspondence: Didier Pittet, MD, MS, Infection Control Program, and WHO Collaborating
Centre on Patient Safety, University of Geneva Hospitals and Faculty of Medicine, 4 Rue
Gabrielle Perret-Gentil, 1211 Geneva 14, Switzerland (didier.pittet@hcuge.ch).
Clinical Infectious Diseases 2011;53(3):280–283
 The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Infectious
Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail:
journals.permissions@oup.com.
1058-4838/2011/533-0010$14.00
DOI: 10.1093/cid/cir375
280 d CID 2011:53 (1 August) d BRIEF REPORT
of mandatory reporting for all staff, there were 249 confirmed
pH1N1 cases among 40511 clinical staff (0.62%) and 119 cases
among 18759 nonclinical staff (0.63%; P 5 .82). The relative risk
of acquiring the infection for clinical versus nonclinical staff was
0.98 (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.78–1.20). A total of 1039
(2.6%) of the clinical staff had confirmed pH1N1 infection
during the entire study period. Most infected clinical HCWs
were nurses (53.4%), health care assistants (27.1%), medical
staff (12.3%), and allied health professionals (7.1%). Table 1
compares the characteristics of clinical and nonclinical staff
with confirmed pH1N1 infection. There were no differences
between clinical and nonclinical staff regarding age, sex, and
presenting symptoms, which were most commonly fever and
cough. We did not identify significant differences in the risk of
infection for HCWs in outpatient departments, accident and
emergency departments, and isolation wards (data not shown).
All confirmed case patients were asked to report whether they
had been in contact with a confirmed infected case in the
community during the 7 days preceding the onset of influenza-
like illness. Among clinical staff, 212 (20%) of 1039 case patients
reported recent contact with a family member or friend with
confirmed pH1N1 infection, which is similar to the 24 (20%) of
119 case patients from nonclinical staff. All nonclinical staff
confirmed that they were not in contact with any patient during
the previous week, whereas 78 (7.5%) of the clinical staff recalled
having provided care to a patient with confirmed pH1N1
infection. Nine (0.9%) of the clinical staff reported unprotected
exposure (ie, managing a patient with confirmed infection
without adequate droplet precautions, typically because the
patient had not yet received a diagnosis at that time). Impor-
tantly, reports of unprotected exposure to a colleague sub-
sequently confirmed to have pH1N1 infection were much more
common (10-fold more common) than exposure to infected
patients (Table 1) and were reported with similar frequency by
clinical (9.0%) and nonclinical (8.4%) staff (P 5 .97).
All clinical staff were asked to evaluate whether their infection
could have resulted from care of a hospitalized patient. The
contact history of the 26 staff who responded affirmatively
Table 1. Characteristics, Symptoms, and Exposure Risk Evaluated Among 1158 Clinical and Nonclinical Health Care Workers With
Confirmed Pandemic Influenza A Virus (pH1N1) Infection, Hong Kong Hospital Authority, June 2009–May 2010
Variable Clinical (n 5 1039) Nonclinical (n 5 119) P
Demographic data
Male 253 (24.4) 36 (30.3) .19
Female 786 (75.7) 83 (69.8)
Mean age (y) 37.0 38.6 .45
Onset signs and symptoms
Fever 883 (85.0) 97 (81.5) .39
Running nose 513 (49.4) 47 (39.5) .05
Sore throat 720 (69.3) 88 (74.0) .35
Cough 864 (83.2) 101 (84.9) .73
Headache 332 (32.0) 39 (32.8) .94
Routine PPE when on duty
Surgical mask 999 (96.2) 70 (58.8) ,.01
N95 1 (0.1) 0 .99
Face/eye shield 33 (3.2) 1 (0.8) .25
Gloves/gown 3 (0.3) 1 (0.8) .35
Contact history
Confirmed case in community
Family 177 (17.0) 16 (13.5) .38
Friend 35 (3.4) 8 (6.7) .07
Others, public transportation 2 (0.2)a 0 .99
No perceived community contact 825 (79.4) 95 (79.8) .99
Unprotected exposure to confirmed case in patient care
Unprotected exposure
Colleague 93 (9.0) 10 (8.4) .98
Patient 9 (0.87) 0 .61
Protected exposure 69 (6.6) 0 ,0.01
Staff infected perceived as due to patient care 26 (2.5) 0 .10
NOTE. Data are no. (%) of subjects unless otherwise indicated. PPE, personal protective equipment.
a Influenza-like illness contact not confirmed as having pH1N1 infection.
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confirmed that all of them had contact with an infected patient,
but with no other documented exposure. Also, 9 of 26 reported
unprotected exposure to patients, 4 of 26 were assigned to an
isolation ward, and 10 of 26 were involved in performing high-
risk procedures. In comparison, among the 1013 HCWs with
confirmed pH1N1 infection that was not perceived as related to
patient care, 0 of 1013 reported unprotected exposure, 7 of 1013
were assigned to an isolation ward, and 16 of 1013 were involved
in performing high-risk procedures.
Infection control guidelines for the pandemic were issued very
early, on 29 April 2009, and stipulated droplet precautions, as
recommended by the World Health Organization [6, 7]. Almost
all (96.2%) of the clinical staff reported using a surgical mask at
all times (Table 1), whereas only a few reported routinely
wearing gowns and gloves, which are not part of droplet
precautions [6]. This suggests that most staff had a correct
understanding of droplet precautions and indicates that the level
of infection control practices is high in Hong Kong. Educational
sessions conducted organization-wide were attended by.39000
staff.
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, we present the largest set of data collected for
HCWs with confirmed pH1N1 infection in the health care set-
ting during the 2009 pandemic. Our most important finding is
that the attack rate was very similar among clinical and non-
clinical staff, showing that there is no increased risk associated
with clinical care of infected pH1N1 patients if adequate in-
fection control practices are in place. This finding is particularly
important because one recent study reported a significantly
higher risk of pH1N1 among clinical HCWs in Saudi Arabia
when infection control personnel were overloaded and practices
possibly suboptimal [8].
Monovalent pH1N1 vaccines were not available in Hong
Kong during the phase of mandatory reporting for both groups,
and so pH1N1 vaccination could not have affected our results.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, the epidemiology of com-
munity contact was similar for clinical and nonclinical staff and
suggests that the greatest risk for HCWs to acquire infection
during the pandemic was from the community. A definite risk in
the health care setting is unprotected exposure to an infected
colleague, but this was also similar for both clinical and non-
clinical staff, and such exposure will also occur in other working
environments. This similarity in risk of infection between clin-
ical and nonclinical staff in Hong Kong has been confirmed in
a separate serologic survey performed among 586 HCWs, which
found similar proportions of clinical (12%) and nonclinical
(14%) staff with antibody titer $1:40 against pH1N1 by viral
neutralization following the first pandemic wave (P 5 .79) [9].
Other serologic surveys have reported a similar infectious risk
between HCWs and the community for both pH1N1 [10, 11]
and seasonal influenza [12].
Potential study limitations include participation and recall
bias associated with questionnaire surveys where there could be
a tendency for staff to report better compliance with infection
control practices. In addition, we recorded data on contact with
pH1N1 patients, but we did not record data on duration of
contact which may affect the risk of infection. Although a small
proportion of staff did appear to be infected during the patient
care process, exposures in the community and to infected col-
leagues appeared to be much more common. Although our
analysis focuses on confirmed cases and may exclude asymp-
tomatic or subclinical infections among HCWs, it is likely that
confirmed cases are of greatest epidemiologic importance, given
that HCWs with asymptomatic infection would not require sick
leave, and might not present an infectious hazard to patients or
colleagues [13].
Our findings have important implications for public health,
for the investigation of both seasonal and new emerging
influenza, and possibly for other respiratory viruses. With ade-
quate infection control practices, HCWs in direct contact with
patients and those who are not in direct contact appear to face
a similar risk of pH1N1 infection. Although HCWsmay not face
a higher risk of pH1N1 infection associated with their occupa-
tion, HCW infection remains extremely important in infection
control because of the potential for onward transmission to
patients. In our study, reported exposure to a pH1N1-infected
colleague was 10-fold more common than reported exposure to
a pH1N1-infected patient. Consequently, in addition to in-
fection control measures during patient care, respiratory hygiene
should be promoted and improved, together with universal
vaccination of both clinical and nonclinical staff.
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